In a democracy, government policies should not just be correlated with citizens’ preferences, but also respond dynamically to them. Using eight decades of data, we examine the magnitude, mechanisms, and moderators of dynamic responsiveness in the American states. We show that on both economic and (especially) social issues, the liberalism of state publics predicts future changes in state policy liberalism. Dynamic responsiveness is gradual, however; large policy shifts are the result of the cumulation of incremental responsiveness over many years. Partisan control of government mediates only a fraction of responsiveness, suggesting that, contrary to conventional wisdom, responsiveness occurs mainly through the adaptation of incumbent officials. Dynamic responsiveness has increased over time but does not seem to be influenced by institutions such as direct democracy or campaign finance regulations. We conclude that our findings, though in some respects normatively ambiguous, on the whole paint a reassuring portrait of statehouse democracy.

Research suggests that military service influences the policy preferences of political elites. Yet, these studies have not considered how self-selection into the armed forces may affect these results. I employ vulnerability to the Vietnam draft lottery to consider two mechanisms for the influence of military service on policy preferences: self-selection and socialization. I compare the roll call votes of Members of Congress in the House of Representatives across the 94th to 113th Congresses who were eligible for the draft and served in the military to those who were eligible for the draft but did not serve. I find a significant difference in the roll call voting behavior between these two groups on foreign and defense policy issues. This distinction cannot be explained by self-selection effects alone, indicating military service is transformative and carrying implications for the study of civil-military relations and elite decision-making in international security.